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Abstract 
The right to Freedom of assembly is among the political rights enshrined under the 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). Despite the 
frequent reporting of its rampant violation by human right monitoring bodies and 
the media, one cannot find a research that assesses the adequacy of protection 
offered to the right by the Ethiopian Constitution and other laws of the country. 
This article seeks to fill this gap by indicating some of the key problems with the 
existing legal regime governing the right and the prevailing practice. As such, it 
argues that the present Constitution of Ethiopia gives an incomplete protection to 
the right, by failing to go beyond listing grounds of limiting it without 
incorporating additional guarantees of preventing arbitrary restrictions such as 
necessity and proportionality in explicit manner. Moreover, it contends that this 
problem was exacerbated by the presence of too many loopholes in the Peaceful 
Demonstration and Public Political Meetings Proclamation that ranges from 
inadequate rules governing notification procedure to the absence of fair hearing 
and judicial or administrative review procedures in the law. Suggestions to 
improve the legal guarantees for freedom of assembly in Ethiopia are also made in 
the article in light of lessons from the experience of other national and 
international jurisdictions with better standards of protection. Furthermore, it 
asserts that reforming the legal regime applicable to freedom of assembly and 
ensuring its appropriate implementation requires a strong political will of the 
ruling party in promoting good governance, respecting rule of law and 
strengthening democratic institutions. 
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Freedom of assembly is a right that is rarely defined in major human rights 
treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). No General Comment that defines what the right protects is issued to 
date. To fill this gap in the existing treaties, several authorities have attempted to 
define what is meant by protected assembly. For instance, the experts of the 
Venice Commission (an advisory body of the Council of Europe) have defined 
an assembly as ‘Intentional and temporary presence of a number of individuals 
in a public place for a common expressive purpose’.1 The right safeguards the 
purposeful gathering of people in public places such as streets, parks, squares or 
other spaces that are freely accessible to the public. The ultimate aim of such 
gathering is the public expression of positions on various issues of public 
concern, be it in a declarative form like the case of public demonstration or an 
inward deliberation and discussion on issues among the assembled as the case in 
public meetings.2  
The right to freedom of assembly only safeguards gatherings which are 
nonviolent.3 This requirement is implied in every definition of a protected 
assembly and unanimously recognized in international human rights instruments 
as well as the domestic constitutions of states. Here it must be noted that, the 
right to freedom of assembly is not an absolute right. Thus, limitations could be 
placed upon it to safeguard other legitimate interests such as national security, 
public safety, public order or respect for the rights of others.4 This however does 
not mean that the right could be restricted arbitrarily by invoking every ground. 
Instead, ‘in each instance of potential limitation the state must clearly define the 
precise purpose served, as well as showing that the measure in question is 
necessary and proportionate’.5 In other words, the state must meet the 
proportionality scrutiny.     
                                           
1 OSCE/ODHIR (2010), Venice Commission Guideline on Freedom of Assembly (2nd ed) 
(June 2010). 
2 O. Salat (2015), The Right to Freedom of Assembly a Comparative Study, Hart , Oxford, 
pp. 5-6. 
3 OSCE/ODHIR (n1), pp. 25-26. 
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49) art. 21; African 
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, (Adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered Into Force 21 October 1986, art. 11.   
5 African Commission on Human and Peoples Right (ACHPR), Report of the Study Group 
on Freedom of Association & Assembly in Africa, (2014), p.21. 
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Like many national constitutions, the present constitution of Ethiopia (FDRE 
Constitution) adopted in 1995 has recognized the right to freedom of assembly.6 
Ethiopia has also ratified all international and regional treaties acknowledging 
this right which further reinforces its obligation to respect and enforce it. 
Moreover, other subsidiary laws were enacted prior to the adoption of the 
Constitution with the objective of facilitating the implementation of the right.7 
Yet, the right remains one of the most repressed political rights in the country as 
witnessed in practice. Severe suppression of the right has led some including the 
author, to regard the right as illusory and devoid of any practical significance.  
To corroborate this assertion, it might be relevant to see the situation in the 
pre and post 2005 Ethiopian general election. This period is imperative for 
anyone who is interested in studying the history of freedom of assembly in 
Ethiopia since the adoption of the Constitution in 1995. It marks the period 
where, the right enjoyed a relative respect for a short duration before it entered 
its several years of hibernation. Unlike the preceding elections which were 
largely boycotted, the 2005 election was competitive to a large extent.8 This is 
mainly attributed to the pledge of the ruling party to open democratic space and 
undertake a free and fair election.9 Accordingly, ‘live televised debates on 
matters of public policy, opposition party access to state-owned media, and 
huge, peaceful rallies’ were seen for the first time.10 Further, in a manner which 
is unprecedented before, nearly one million people in the capital displayed their 
support for opposition parties through an entirely peaceful demonstration.11 
Other massive rallies were also held by opposition supporters in many parts of 
the country without much difficulty. 
However, these developments were short-lived. On the evening of the 
election date, the late prime minster issued a decree that outlaws the conducting 
of demonstration in the capital for a period of one month which was extended 
                                           
6 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution (1995), art. 30(1). 
7 The Proclamation to Provide for Peaceful Demonstration and Public Political Meetings, 
Proclamation No. 3/1991, Federal Negarit Gazzeta 50th Year No. 4, Addis Ababa, 12 
August 1991 (hereinafter Demonstration and Political Meeting Proclamation). 
8 Terrence Lyons, ‘Ethiopia in 2005: The Beginning of a Transition?’ African Notes No.25 
Center for Strategic and International Studies January 2006 <https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/anotes_0601.pdf > 
accessed on 23 October 2016. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Stefan Brüne (2010), ‘The European Union and its Africa strategy Case study Ethiopia’ in 
Valeria Bello and  Behailu Geberewold (eds)A Global Security Triangle European, 
African and Asian Interaction , Routledge Taylor Francis Group, London and New York, 
p.142. 
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until July 2005.12 Those who defied the order of the prime minster paid dearly 
with their lives and bodies. Even after the expiry of the ban on demonstration, in 
September and subsequent months, municipalities and other administrative units 
consistently refused to allow gatherings organized by opposition parties in 
different parts of the country.13 This marked the beginning for the long period of 
dormancy for the right. Thus, for eight years subsequent to the 2005 
controversial election, no demonstration was held in the capital Addis Ababa.14 
Even after 2013, a number of notifications for undertaking public 
demonstrations or political meetings were either denied by the authorities 
regulating assemblies from the very outset or dispersed by force subsequently.15 
Many people also died and sustained bodily injury in the course of exercising 
this right in Oromia and Amhara regional states of Ethiopia.16 The violence and 
destruction of property that ensued following the crackdown of the protests by 
security personnel ultimately led to the declaration of state of emergency17 by 
the government which entailed the complete suspension of the right to freedom 
of assembly and severe restrictions to other fundamental freedoms throughout 
                                           
12 Carter Center, Observing The 2005 Ethiopia National Elections Carter Center Final 
Report  (December 2009) p.4. 
13 U.S Department of State, ‘Ethiopia’ (8 March 2006). 
<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61569.htm>  accessed on 21 October 2016. 
14 Solomon Goshu, ‘Peaceful Political Rallies: The Right Besieged by Hurdles’, The 
Reporter, 31 January 2015 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201502020437.html> accessed 3l 
March 2016; Human Right Watch, World Report 2015: Ethiopia,  
<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/ethiopia>  accessed  on  27  
May 2016. 
15 Neamin Ashenafi, ‘Cancellation of Planned Demonstration Annoys Medrek’ 
<http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/cancellation-planned-demonstration-annoys-
medrek> accessed 1April 2016; ‘Ethiopia Arrests 43 Anti-Graziani Statute Protesters in 
Addis Ababa’ <http://www.awrambatimes.com/?p=13407> accessed 31 March 2016, 
Ethiopian Police Crackdown On Anti-Saudi Protest’. 
<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ethiopian-police-crackdown-anti-saudi-protest> accessed 31 
March 2016. 
16 ‘UN Experts Urge Ethiopia To Halt Violent Crackdown On Oromia Protesters, Ensure 
Accountability For Abuses’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16977&LangI
D=#sthash.veMqExX4.dpuf > accessed 1 April 2016; ‘Ethiopia: Dozens killed as Police 
Use excessive force against peaceful Protesters’ 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/ethiopia-dozens-killed-as-police-use-
excessive-force-against-peaceful-protesters/? > accessed on 18 November 2016;‘Dozens 
killed in Ethiopia protest crackdown’ <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/30-killed-
ethiopia-protests-opposition-160808105428331.html> accessed on 18 November 2016.                                   
17 ‘Ethiopia declares state of emergency as deadly protests continue’ The Guardian (10 
October 2016)  <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/10/ethiopia-declares-state-
of-emergency-as-deadly-protests-continue>  accessed: 18 November 2016. 
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the country. Further, more than 11,000 people were arrested by the Ethiopian 
government ‘command post’ subsequently for their alleged involvement in 
violence and destruction of property.18  According to the Ethiopian Broadcasting 
Corporation, 9,980 detainees were expected to be released until the end of 
December 2016 (EBC; December 17, 2016). 
This article seeks to critically assess the contribution of the existing 
Ethiopian legal regime governing freedom of assembly for this state and its 
adequacy from a comparative perspective. Accordingly, the first section 
explores the rationale for protecting freedom of assembly by pointing certain 
features and functions that distinguishes it from other rights. The second section 
examines the protection of the right under the FDRE Constitution by focusing 
on limitations. Sections 3 to 7 analyze the provisions of the Ethiopian Peaceful 
Demonstration and Public Political Meeting proclamations by giving emphasis 
to issues of notifications, spontaneous assemblies, restrictions on time, place and 
conduct, public order and public safety limitations, hearing procedure and 
judicial review. These aspects would be critically examined in the light of 
selected practices and cases in a comparative manner. The last section assesses 
the importance of political will of those in power towards promoting good 
governance, rule of law and strengthening democratic institutions to address the 
problems identified in the legal regime and its implementation.   
1. The Utility of Freedom of Assembly 
Given the strong interlink between the right to freedom of expression and the 
right to freedom of assembly, some question whether the latter adds any unique 
value. Concerning the relation between the two sets of rights, one must 
underscore the undisputed fact that any form of assembly ultimately has a 
communicative or expressive purpose. As such, the expression aspect of 
freedom of assembly is within the purview of protection of the right to freedom 
of expression19 because demonstration and meeting constitute one of the 
mechanisms available for disseminating one’s view. This has led some to 
contend that if the ultimate objective of freedom of assembly is ‘expression’, 
individuals should utilize other options of communicating their concerns 
through the mass media including news papers, radio, TV or internet.20 The 
justification they offer in support of their contention is that, since ordinary 
                                           
18 ‘Ethiopia state of emergency arrests top 11,000’ 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/ethiopia-state-emergency-arrests-top-11000-
161112191919319.html > accessed 18 November 2016. 
19 Manfred Nowak et al (eds) (2012), All Human Rights for All: Vienna Manual on Human 
Rights, Antwerp: Intersentia; Vienna : NW Verlag Recht,  p.382. 
20 Eric Barendt (2000), ‘Freedom of Assembly’, Chapter 9 in Jack Beatson and Yvonne 
Cripps(eds.), Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information, OUP, p.161.  
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assemblies create inconvenience for the public by disrupting the flow of traffic 
and operation of businesses, individuals should resort to less disruptive channels 
of communication.21  
What such critics ignore is that, expression through mass media is 
qualitatively different from physical assemblies. By virtue of their physical 
presence together in public places, the latter indicate how committed and united 
they are for the cause they stand for which has the capacity to exert influence on 
the government.22  Further, the dramatic nature of expression also enables 
participants to express their position in a vivid and influential manner. 
Moreover, all sections of the society do not have equal access to various means 
of communication because of poverty or marginalization. Hence, ‘freedom of 
assembly provides opportunities for public expression of those with less power, 
wealth or status.’23  In particular, freedom of assembly guards the rights of the 
minorities from the tyranny of the majority. Any democratic system aspires to 
rule/implement the wishes of the majority of the people while protecting the 
rights of the minorities. Freedom of assembly pursues this aspiration of 
democracy by allowing minorities to assemble together and voice their concerns 
and interests.24 At times, freedom of assembly could be the only way to make 
their voice heard since they do not have the power to influence the political 
process using the normal system of election since they would be outnumbered. 
It would also enhance their right to self determination enabling them to promote 
their culture, way of living and identity.25    
An assembly is primarily ‘characterized by physical presence of multitude of 
individuals who are aligned by a common purpose to collectively communicate 
a cause to the general public [emphasis added]’.26 What made the collective 
expression of concern possible in the first place is physical gathering of many 
individuals with a shared interest. Hence, what an assembly distinctly 
safeguards is the ‘bodily togetherness of a group of people’.27 In the absence of 
the right to freedom of assembly, individuals could not gather in the first place 
for voicing matters affecting public interest. And this attribute is not addressed 
by freedom of expression.  
                                           
21 Id., 164. 
22 Id., 166. 
23 N. Jarman  and M. Hamilton (2009), “Protecting peaceful protest: The OSCE/ODHIR and 
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly” Journal of Human Rights Practice Vol.1 No.2 (2009), p. 
208. 
24 Solyom Peter (tras) (2008), ‘The Constitutional Principles of Freedom of Assembly in 
Hungary’, Fundamentum Vol.12, p.37. 
25 OSCE/ODHIR supra note 1, p.13. 
26 Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (ed) (2012), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, p.951. 
27 Ibid. 
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The underlying goal of the two rights is different. Freedom of expression is 
characterized by some scholars as civil right primarily because its prime focus is 
to allow the individual fulfill himself by speaking his mind.28 The ‘discovery of 
truth’ through the exchange of different ideas is also mentioned as an additional 
aim of the right.29 In contrast, the right to freedom of assembly is characterized 
as political right since its principal target is the governing of the polity and 
democratic process.30 Hence, assemblies primarily promote collective interests 
rather than individual ones. Besides, the contribution of assemblies for 
discovery of truth is also minimal since the prime concern of the participants in 
a demonstration is not discovering the truth but making their voice heard and 
taking a position.31 
Freedom of assembly is also regarded as an ‘early warning’ instrument for 
democracies that something is going wrong with the system.32 Protests against 
the government expressed in the form of demonstration would indicate that 
some sections of the society are seriously dissatisfied with the way the 
government is handling certain matters. In a democratic system, governments 
are expected to be responsive to the demands of the people.33 As such, when the 
people express their displeasure, the government must seriously consider those 
issues and address them properly before they are exacerbated. Ignoring the early 
warning might make it difficult for the government to handle issues after they 
go out of control. 
2. Freedom of Assembly under the Ethiopian Constitution 
The FDRE Constitution provides that all persons have the ‘right to assemble’ ‘to 
demonstrate’ and ‘to petition’.34 The fact that the Constitution does not define 
each of these terms might not be surprising given the nature of constitutions that 
merely enshrine general principles. It is to be noted that the prevailing literature 
characterizes them as different forms of assembly. The ‘right to assemble’ in the 
Constitution primarily refers to public meetings conducted with the purpose of 
deliberating on certain important matters.35 This could be contrasted with the 
‘right to demonstrate’ that has the principal objective of proclaiming the 
position of the assembled on an essential matter to the external audience 
                                           
28 Nowak, supra note 19, p. 371. 
29 Barendt, supra note 20, p.166. 
30 Nowak, supra note 19, p.371. 
31 Barendt supra note 20, p.166. 
32 Salat ,  supra note 2,  pp.49-50. 
33 Ibid. 
34 FDRE Constitution, supra note 6, art 30(1). 
35 Salat, supra note 2, p.6. 
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concerned.36 Hence, the target of demonstration is getting attention of an 
outsider rather than discussing the issue among the assembled. 
This line of interpretation also conforms to the stipulations of the 
Proclamation on Peaceful Demonstration and Public Political Meeting37 which 
serves as the implementing legislation in Ethiopia for the constitutional 
provision that enshrines the right to freedom of assembly. Accordingly, the 
Proclamation makes a distinction between ‘peaceful demonstration’ and ‘public 
political meeting’ and defines them separately. By peaceful demonstration the 
Proclamation refers to ‘any public and orderly procession in which a group of 
people express their ideas through speech, songs, mottos, placards etc... 
[emphasis added]’.38 This definition fits to the declaratory nature of 
demonstrations. The usage of symbols, songs and placards is also a 
distinguishing feature of such gatherings. With respect to ‘public political 
meetings’ the Proclamation explicates its meaning in the following manner ‘any 
meeting in which a group of people discuss political and politics oriented issues 
[emphasis added]’.39 From this, one can observe that the focus of political 
meetings is more on deliberation and discussion than expression of stance.   
The tricky part in the Ethiopian constitutional provision recognizing freedom 
of assembly is the ‘right to petition’. Does it provide something which is not 
covered either by right to assembly or demonstration?  Or is it a needless 
duplication? To address these questions, we can examine the interpretation 
given to such formulations in early constitutions that included the right to 
assemble and the right to petition in the same provision.  A good example in this 
regard is the First Amendment of the US Constitution adopted in 1791. It 
provides: ‘Congress shall make no law … abridging … the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances’40.  
According to El-Haj, the framers of the US Constitution saw a strong 
intersection between the two sets of right, and that explains why they paired 
them.41 He states that some of the founders of the Constitution argued that in the 
normal course of things, submission of grievances by the public to the 
government are preceded by the assembly of the people to seriously deliberate 
on the issue and it is only logical to place the two rights together. However, it is 
important to note that not all assemblies have the ultimate purpose of 
                                           
36 Id., p.5. 
37 Demonstration and Political meeting Proclamation, supra note 7 . 
38 Id., art.2(1). 
39 Id., art.2(2). 
40 U.S. Const. amend. I 
41 El-Haj Tabatha Abu, ‘The Neglected Right to Freedom of Assembly’, (2009) 56 UCLA 
Law Review 560-566. 
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communicating discontent or petition. They might be convened for deliberation 
or celebratory purpose. Likewise, the right to petition is not necessarily tied to 
the right to freedom of assembly since protest could be expressed by using 
various channels of communication without the need to assemble.  
The same logic can explain the pairing of the right to freedom of assembly 
with the right to petition under the Ethiopian Constitution. Hence, it could be 
argued that the Constitution made reference to the right to petition in this 
provision in order to underscore that the right to freedom of assembly or 
demonstration is not only confined to mere deliberation on an issue or 
demonstration. Rather, it could go to the extent of demanding the government to 
address their grievances deliberated and expressed through demonstration. As 
such, the presence of the right to petition in the provision (that recognizes 
freedom of assembly) further enhances the exercise of the right to assembly by 
explicitly informing the people about their entitlement to express their 
dissatisfactions with the measures or actions of the government and demand 
redress by using demonstration as a channel. 
The Constitution also lists the grounds for limiting freedom of assembly 
which includes ‘public convenience’, ‘protection of democratic rights’, ‘public 
morality’ and ‘peace’.42 The terms ‘public convenience’ and ‘democratic rights’ 
are somewhat unique. This is because it is uncommon to find such kind of 
formulations in other jurisdictions. For instance, ‘national security or public 
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ are mentioned as the only 
possible reasons for restricting the right under the ICCPR.43 These grounds are 
often addressed in human rights literature and jurisprudence of courts as 
‘legitimate aims’ for restricting a right. With respect to public safety, it refers to 
safeguard ‘against danger to the safety of the persons, their life or physical 
integrity, or serious damage to their property.’44   
The ground ‘public order’ is more tricky because of its relative broadness. 
According to the Siracusa Principles, ‘public order’ refers to ‘sum of rules 
which ensure the functioning of the society or set of fundamental principles on 
which the society is founded.’45 The FDRE Constitution seems to allow the 
consideration of ‘public convenience’ as a ground for restricting the venue and 
                                           
42 FDRE Constitution, supra note 6, art 30(1). 
43 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49) art. 21. 
44 Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter Siracusa Principles) Annex, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984) art vii para.33. 
45 Id., para.22. 
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route for conducting an assembly or a demonstration. In its essence, the ground 
resembles ‘public order’ stipulated under the ICCPR since its ultimate objective 
is to ensure the smooth functioning of society. Interpreting public convenience 
as such might also be logical since the FDRE Constitution looks up to 
international treaties like ICCPR for interpreting fundamental rights recognized 
by it.46   
The other ground for limiting freedom of assembly in the Constitution i.e. 
‘protection of democratic rights’, does not sound sensible considering the 
unusual classification of human rights enshrined in it as ‘fundamental rights and 
freedoms’ on the one hand and ‘democratic rights’ on the other hand, without 
providing the criteria for classifying them as such. Under the first group, rights 
like right to life, liberty, freedom of religion and the right to fair trial are 
included inter alia.47 The second category (i.e. democratic rights’) includes 
freedom of speech, association, assembly, right of women, right to vote, right of 
children etc...48 A textual reading of the FDRE Constitution leads to the 
conclusion that, freedom of assembly is susceptible to limitation only where 
democratic rights listed above are threatened which does not make any sense. 
Hence, the broad stipulation of ‘rights of others’ envisaged in the ICCPR sounds 
more logical and inclusive. 
However, the listing of legitimate grounds for restricting freedom of 
assembly by the Constitution is only the first step that prevents an arbitrary 
limitation of the right. A full-fledged protection requires suitability of the 
chosen means, necessity and proportionality. Yet, the FDRE Constitution does 
not go beyond qualifying limitations on freedom of assembly with a phrase 
‘appropriate regulations’.49 No implementing legislation or decision of an 
Ethiopian court has elaborated what makes a regulation appropriate and the 
parameters for saying so. It is only through an extended constructive 
interpretation and reference to international human rights instruments ratified by 
Ethiopia that one may arguably contend that appropriateness refers to suitability, 
necessity and proportionality tests of acceptable limitation.  
This author uses the word suitability in reference to the need to ensure that 
the means chosen by the legislature for regulating freedom of assembly must in 
one way or another contribute for attaining the legitimate aims.50 If the means 
has no connection with the objective intended to be achieved, it would be 
unacceptable. The necessity requirement envisages the need to examine the 
                                           
46 FDRE Constitution, supra note 6, art. 13(1). 
47 Id., art. 15, 17, 20& 27. 
48 Id., art. 29-44. 
49 Id., art. 30. 
50 Dieter Grimm (2007), “Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional 
Jurisprudence”, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol.7 (2007) p. 390. 
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various alternatives available for addressing the concerns, based on which the 
legislature must select the one which entails the smallest impairment to persons 
exercising their right to freedom of assembly.51 Assuming that, the legislature 
meets the necessity requirement, the final step is determining proportionality by 
weighing the respective gain or loss for the rights concerned.  
This requires putting two things on the scale: the social importance of the 
purpose served by the limitation of the right in question i.e. freedom of 
assembly vis-à-vis the damage the right sustains because of the restriction.52 If 
the balance between the two is right, then the government measure would be a 
sound limitation of the right. In contrast, if the cost to the right caused by the 
limitations significantly exceeds the social importance gained because of its 
limitation, then the government measure would be held unconstitutional because 
it fails to pass the key test of proportionality which is a criterion used in the 
balance. 
3.  Notification Requirement of Assemblies  
The Peaceful Demonstration and Public Political Meetings, Proclamation 
predates Ethiopia’s current Constitution. The Proclamation was initially 
designed to facilitate the exercise of political rights after their total demise 
during the Derg military regime. The preamble of the Proclamation provides 
that the objective of the law is to enable people ‘start enjoying their democratic 
rights forthwith, until detailed laws are worked out and promulgated’.53 Yet, the 
promise of the Proclamation is still unfulfilled (even long after the adoption of 
the Constitution), and there are several problems and controversies with regard 
to its contents and application. 
Unlike most fundamental freedoms, the exercise of the right to freedom of 
assembly needs compliance with certain procedural requirements set by the 
legislature. 54 This is almost a universal reality and it is difficult to find a 
jurisdiction which does not attach a procedural pre-condition for its realization. 
The main procedural requirement that organizers have to comply with in many 
systems is that of ‘giving notice’ to or ‘seeking authorization’ from the 
authorities.55  It is sometimes difficult to point out the real difference between 
‘notice’ and ‘permission’, since the authorities regulating freedom of assembly 
could prohibit the undertaking of the assembly on the basis of facts stated in the 
notice. For instance, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
                                           
51 Id., p.389. 
52 Id., p. 340. 
53 Demonstration and Political Meeting Proclamation, supra note 7 Preamble. 
54 Salat , supra note 2, p.55. 
55 Id., pp. 58 & 72. 
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Working Group reports that despite the absence of a legal requirement of 
seeking permission for organizing an assembly in some systems, ‘in practice the 
state often refuses to grant permits to assemblies critical of the government.’56 
Yet, the requirement of giving notice of ‘intent’ to conduct an assembly is 
regarded as sufficient and ideal measure, rather than imposing the duty of asking 
permission from the authorities to exercise the right. The prerequisite of 
permission will relegate the right to freedom of assembly to a privilege 
dependent on the goodwill of those regulating it.57 Further, it is imperative to 
note that the prime purpose of notification must be facilitating the smooth 
undertaking of an assembly by making necessary arrangements in advance.58  
As a matter of theory, Ethiopia follows the notification system for controlling 
assemblies, by virtue of the Demonstration and Public Political Meeting 
Proclamation.59 The key provision in this regard is article 4 of the Proclamation 
which stipulates the procedure for submitting notice. Accordingly, it provides 
that ‘any individual, group or organization that organizes a peaceful 
demonstration or public political meeting has the obligation to give written 
notice 48 hours before the intended peaceful demonstration or public political 
meeting is to take place’.60 The timeframe for submitting notification provided 
by the Ethiopian law is reasonable considering the time authorities, organizers 
and police need to properly facilitate the undertaking of the assembly. In other 
jurisdictions, the duration of notification for assemblies ranges from 6 hours to 
28 days.61   
The Proclamation requires the notice to be presented to the administration of 
the municipality (or to local administrations in rural areas). Here, it is important 
to note various points related with the procedures of notification. First, both 
indoor and outdoor assemblies are subjected to the requirement of notice in 
Ethiopia. This is not the case in jurisdictions like Germany which do not require 
notification for indoor assemblies,62 the justification being the non-occurrence 
of traffic and other inconveniences as a result of such gatherings. Second, 
Ethiopia’s law demands notification regardless of the size of assembly or the 
number of participants. This deviates from the practice in many jurisdictions. 
                                           
56 African Commission on Human and Peoples Right (ACHPR), Report of the Study Group 
on Freedom of Association & Assembly in Africa, (2014), p. 61. 
57 ‘Factsheet: Recommendations on Managing Assemblies Joint Report of Special 
Rapporteurs Maina Kiai and Christof  Heyns to the Human Rights Council’, March 2016 
(A/HRC/31/66). 
58 OSCE/ODHIR supra note 1, s.1 para.4.1. 
59 Demonstration and Political meeting Proclamation, supra note 7. 
60 Id., art. 4(1). 
61Jarman and Hamilton, supra note 23.  
62 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany 2010,  art 8. 
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For instance, the Armenian assembly law exempts small gatherings up to 100 
participants from the requirement of notification.63  
Likewise, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and experts 
of OSCE/ODIHR argue for the exemption of assemblies with insignificant 
number of participants from observing notification pre-condition.64 Their 
argument centers on the very purpose of notification which is ‘facilitate’ the 
undertaking of an assembly by addressing possible concerns such as traffic and 
security issues in advance.65 If the number of the assembled individuals is very 
few, it is unlikely for them to cause disruption to traffic or societal order. Hence, 
to require notice for such assemblies might defeat the underlying rationale of 
notification and it will be a disproportionate restriction of the right. Yet, what 
constitutes a small assembly is still controversial.  
Aside from the features of notification highlighted in the preceding 
paragraphs, the Ethiopian law regulating assemblies also provides what a letter 
of notification should contain. Accordingly, notice submitted by organizers is 
required to state: the objective of the assembly, place of conducting it, routes it 
goes through, date, time, estimation of possible attendees and finally the kind of 
assistance they expect from the city administration in the course of undertaking 
the assembly.66 The law does not specify the purpose of requiring these details 
even if one can presume that it is to make the necessary arrangements in 
advance. On this issue, the UN Special Rapporteur underscores the need to go 
beyond presuming the government’s duty of cooperation in facilitating 
assemblies. Rather, a clear statement of this duty in a legislation (that regulates 
assembly) is necessary for the effective protection of the right.67  
Hence, the explicit obligation imposed on the security personnel by the 
Ethiopian assembly law to ensure peace and security68 might be considered as a 
step in the right direction, if it is implemented properly. Yet, the Ethiopian law 
is silent about the possibility of making modification to a notification of 
assembly that is submitted and the consequences that follow. On this matter, the 
stipulation of the Armenian assembly law can offer insights. If the organizers 
make changes that affect the essence or the notified assembly, Armenia’s law 
                                           
63 Republic of Armenia Law on Freedom of Assemblies 2011, art. 9(1) & 24. 
64 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of 
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65 Ibid. 
66 Demonstration and Political meeting Proclamation, supra note 7, art. 5(1). 
67 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of 
Association , Maina Kiai, (hereinafter report of the Special Rapporteur ) A/HRC/20/27 
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requires them to submit a new notice.69 We can infer that the change made is 
major or substantial. In contrast, if the change is very minor and insubstantial, 
the authorities must tolerate the deviation and facilitate the assembly without 
demanding the re-submission of notice.     
Once the notification is received, the Ethiopian assembly law gives 12 hours 
for the authorities to make a decision on it.70 The inclusion of time limit for 
decision making is a positive thing since it helps to ensure timeliness of decision 
and accountability of authorities. The verdict of the administrative officials 
could either be to give the green light for the assembly to proceed as planned or 
to make a suggestion for the undertaking of ‘the public demonstration or public 
political meeting to be held at some other time or place.’71 The grounds for 
postponing the assembly to another venue or time must relate to concerns of 
safeguarding peace, security or preventing the disruption of the day to day 
activities of the public.72  
These grounds seem to give authorities broader power and discretion for 
postponing assemblies compared to other jurisdictions like Kenya. Under 
Kenyan assembly law, the only ground that justifies the postponement or 
relocation of a planned assembly is the prior reservation of the place selected for 
the gathering by another assembly to be conducted at the same time.73  Thus, 
Kenya’s law does not allow the undertaking of two assemblies having different 
objectives at the same place and time. This seems true for Ethiopia as well, even 
if the law is silent on that issue. However, such practice of banning counter 
demonstrations is regarded by the UN Special Rapporteur as unjustified 
restriction on freedom of assembly.74 The ideal solution is to find a means of 
conducting both assemblies without prejudicing each other. 
 4. Gaps and Practical Challenges in the Notification 
Regime for Assemblies 
In the preceding paragraphs, an attempt has been made to provide a general 
outline of the Ethiopian notification regime through a comparative lens. The 
focus of this section is more on the gaps in the law and challenges of 
implementation as observed in different practical cases. The discretionary 
interpretation of the notification provision of the Ethiopian assembly law gives a 
                                           
69 Republic of Armenia Law on Freedom of Assemblies, supra note 63, art. 14(5). 
70 Demonstration and Political meeting Proclamation, supra note 7, art.6 (2). 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Public Order Act Chapter 56 of the Laws of Kenya. Rev. 2009, s. 5(12). 
74 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of 
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310                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 10, No.2                              December 2016  
 
 
partial explanation for the absence of a single demonstration in the Ethiopian 
capital between 2005-2013.75 It is also cited as an explanation for the failure of 
the majority of assemblies subsequent to 2013. One could only find a handful of 
assemblies conducted successfully since then. 
4.1 Issues Related to Receipt of Notification, Decline and Silence 
The problem begins with the refusal on the part of the administrative officials to 
receive the letter of intent to conduct assembly by the organizers. This happens 
often when the place, time or purpose of the assembly is not agreeable to the 
authorities for various reasons. A good example of such a case could be the 
demonstration organized by Semayawi Party (Blue party) in Addis Ababa, on 
September 7, 2013.76 The press release of the party indicated that it approached 
the Addis Ababa City Administration Peaceful Demonstration and Meetings 
Notification Department on September 5, 2013 with a letter of notification to 
conduct a demonstration on the said date but the latter declined to receive the 
notification. The party also sent the same letter via Ethiopian Postal Service but, 
according to the statement made the party, the notification department of the 
municipality was still defiant to receive the letter.77 This was later resolved after 
leaders of the party discussed the matter with the Office of the Mayor and got 
the explanation that it is impossible to conduct the assembly on the planned date 
since various public places in the city will be occupied by sale exhibition of 
small micro enterprises operating in the city; this forced the party to postpone 
the demonstration for another time.78   
Evidently, the refusal of the authorities to receive the letter of notification is 
an arbitrary exercise of their power. If they have a problem with the undertaking 
of the assembly on the planned date and time, what they should do is accept the 
notification and give whatever decision they think is appropriate by taking into 
account the principle of proportionality. This problem is partly due to the gap in 
the implementing legislation as it fails to clearly order authorities to accept any 
notification that meets the formality requirement set by the law. Further, there is 
no mechanism of verifying whether the authorities have received notification of 
an assembly. This is often a cause for evidentiary controversy between the 
organizers of an assembly and the authorities in Ethiopia. To address this 
                                           
75 Solomon Goshu, ‘Peaceful Political Rallies: The Right Besieged by Hurdles’, The 
Reporter, 31 January 2015 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201502020437.html> accessed on 
3l March 31, 2016. 
76 ‘Blue Party Demonstration Postponed to 22 September 2013’ (Amharic), 
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problem, the experience of Kenya, Armenia and the recommendations of UN 
human rights bodies are relevant.  
The Kenyan Public Order Act provides that ‘the regulating officer shall keep 
a public register of all notices received.’79 It also gives the public the right to 
examine or inspect the register of notifications in the opening hour of office.80 
Likewise, the Armenian assembly law besides demanding recording of the 
notice in a special register, also requires the authorities to immediately post a 
copy of the submitted notice in the ‘administrative building’ of the authority as 
well as on its website.81 This practice is also regarded by the UN Special 
Rapporteur as a measure on the right track that ensures transparency and 
accountability. He further endorses the suggestion of the Venice Commission of 
Experts requiring the inclusion of a provision that forces authorities to 
immediately issue receipt of acceptance of notification.82 Incorporation of such a 
provision in the Ethiopian legal regime that regulates assemblies would have 
helped in resolving some of the issues. 
Another problem relates to the failure on the part of the Ethiopian authorities 
to communicate (to the organizers) their decision on the status of received 
notification within the prescribed period set by the law. In some cases, the 
organizers considered the silence of the municipality administration office as 
acceptance or recognition and have suffered from the consequences such as 
imprisonment and violent dispersal of the assembly. An example to this problem 
is the demonstration that was organized (for March 17, 2013) by the Blue party, 
Baleraey Wetatoch Mahiber (Visionary Youth Association) and Private Initiative 
Committee for the Defense of Ethiopian People’s Dignity and Heritage.83 The 
notice dated March 4, 2013 was addressed to the Addis Ababa City 
Administration Peaceful Demonstration and Meeting Notification Department. 
It states that the purpose of the demonstration is to oppose the construction of a 
museum and memorial park in Italy for Rodolfo Graziani who is regarded as a 
fascist war criminal by the organizers as he massacred thousands of Ethiopians 
during the 5 years of Italian occupation.84  
The form of the assembly planned was a procession that starts at Yekatit 12 
square where the statute of martyrs massacred by Graziani is located, and the 
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final destination was planned to be the Embassy of Italy in Addis Ababa. 
According to the organizers, the Municipality accepted the notification and kept 
silent. They took its silence as a tacit approval and went on to conduct the 
demonstration as planned. However, the Police dispersed the assembly as illegal 
for failing to get recognition from the Administration and it arrested 43 
individuals who participated in the demonstration.85  Such problems could have 
easily been resolved had the Ethiopian assembly law clearly provided the 
consequences of inability or unwillingness of the administrative officials to 
render and communicate their decisions within the timeframe set by the law like 
the one provided in the Armenian assembly law. In this regard, the Armenian 
law on assemblies states that failure to make a timely decision on notifications is 
‘considered as that the notification is acknowledged’.86 Similarly, the UN 
Special Rapporteur and Venice Committee of Experts note that the principle that 
silence amounts to acceptance shall govern such situations and the law should 
allow demonstrators ‘to proceed with the planned assembly in accordance with 
the terms notified and without restriction.’87  
4.2. Treatment of Spontaneous Assemblies in Ethiopia 
The other problematic issue in the Ethiopian legal regime governing notification 
of gatherings is that of ‘spontaneous assemblies’. According to the Venice 
Committee of Experts, such assemblies refer to those ‘organized in response to 
some occurrence, incident, other assembly, or speech, where the organizer (if 
there is one) is unable to meet the legal deadline for prior notification, or where 
there is no organizer at all.’88 As their name suggests, these assemblies are 
accidental and not planned in advance. What usually induces their occurrence is 
a certain unforeseen event which is of interest to the public. Such incidents 
might induce the public to react immediately by going out to the streets without 
observing the notification requirement for normal assemblies. Various 
authorities including the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of assembly 
recognize such kind of assemblies as exceptional in nature deserving a special 
treatment.89 Thus, states are expected to devise (in their laws) a mechanism of 
allowing such assemblies without requiring the ordinary process of notifying 
assemblies which might take some time. Further, demanding spontaneous 
assemblies to go through similar notification procedure deprives their immediate 
nature and undermines their value.90   
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Ethiopia’s law (indicated in footnote 7 above) that regulates freedom of 
assembly does not leave a room for making any exception for spontaneous 
assemblies regarding notification requirement. The law treats spontaneous 
assemblies as any other form of assembly and does not provide a special 
treatment. This lacuna in the law has created a serious problem for exercising 
the right to freedom of assembly in Ethiopia as it deprives spontaneous 
assemblies from any protection.  
Two cases of spontaneous assemblies which were dispersed by security 
personnel –for failing to give advance notice– illustrate this problem. The first 
spontaneous demonstration took place in Addis Ababa on November 15, 2013 in 
front of the Saudi Arabia Embassy. What triggered the demonstration was the 
killing of three Ethiopians by the Saudi police and the decision of the Saudi 
government to deport around 23,000 illegal workers of Ethiopian origin.91 The 
release of a video showing ‘a crowed dragging an Ethiopian from his house and 
beating him’ created grievance in the public. Banners carried during the 
demonstration show the disappointment of the people on the Ethiopian 
government’s careless handing of the problem and its failure to safeguard the 
interest of Ethiopian citizens working abroad.92 The reaction of the police was to 
disperse the demonstrators and arrest some of the participants on the allegation 
that they conducted a demonstration without getting the approval of the city 
administration. In his response to the AFP broadcasting agency, the then 
spokesperson of the government Shimeles Kemal noted that the demonstration 
was terminated because ‘it was an illegal demonstration, they had not [obtained] 
a permit from the appropriate office’.93  
The second example of spontaneous assembly is the one that was dispersed 
by the Police. It was triggered by a video released by the ISIS which showed the 
beheading of 28 Ethiopian Christians in Libya.94  In his statement, the then 
government spokesperson Redwan Hussein said that ‘it was not clear if the 
victims were Ethiopians and the Ethiopian Embassy in Cairo was investigating 
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the matter’, and this statement further added fuel to the fire.95 Aggrieved with 
the reaction of the government on the incident, thousands went out to the streets 
on April 21, 2015 (without any organizer) by carrying banners with statements 
saying ‘where is our government’, ‘justice for the dead’, ‘sovereignty is the 
safety of citizens everywhere in the world’ and ‘don’t tell us they are not ours’.96 
The city administration reacted by deploying members of Addis Ababa 
police and federal police forces, and stopped the protestors from heading to the 
headquarters of the African Union and National Palace.97  Like the Saudi protest 
discussed above, no violence on the part of the protesters was reported. Such 
practice of dispersing spontaneous assemblies by administrative officials and 
police forces stands in direct contrast with the position of the UN Human Rights 
Committee.98 This prompts another crucial issue regarding the fate of assemblies 
conducted without giving notice. 
4.3. Fate of Assemblies without Notice 
Ethiopian assembly does not clearly provide the measures taken against 
gatherings that are conducted without prior notification. The practice in Ethiopia 
shows that, any public demonstration or public political meeting which fails to 
comply with the requirement of notification is by definition illegal and 
forbidden. It usually ends up with dispersal and with filing of criminal charges 
against participants of such assembly.99 The Criminal Code of Ethiopia also 
contains a provision that penalizes persons who take part in an assembly 
prohibited by law which includes gatherings undertaken in the absence of 
notification.100 It also extends criminal liability to those who avail their land, 
property or hall to such assemblies.101  
On the contrary, the UN Human Rights Committee has (in several cases 
before it) decided that mere failure of organizers to notify authorities does not 
give the latter an automatic power to disperse the assembly and arrest 
participants so long as the assembly is peaceful. For example, the case of Igor 
Bazarov v Belarus102 involves the dispersal of a street procession conducted by 
the applicant and his subsequent liability for administrative offences. Igor, a 
citizen of Belarus, conducted a street procession on March 25, 2009 with two 
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other participants without getting permission from the appropriate organ of the 
city. Their march began at independence square and they were waving a ‘white, 
red, white’ flag which they think is ‘symbol of revival for Belarus.’103 After 
conducting the procession for 10 minutes, police stopped their march and took 
custody of Igor on the ground that he conducted the procession without getting 
authorization which is required by law. He was later found guilty of committing 
an administrative offence of undertaking a procession lacking permission and 
was fined 70, 000 Belarusian Rubles.104 Aggrieved with the decision of 
Belarusian courts, the applicant approached the UN Human Rights Committee 
alleging the infringement of the right to freedom of assembly recognized by the 
ICCPR and Belarusian Constitution. 
In its decision of 2014, the Committee found that Belarusian authorities have 
violated the right to freedom of assembly. The reasoning of the Committee 
underlined that the right to freedom of assembly is enshrined in the Constitution 
of Belarus and the state is also a party to the ICCPR which recognizes the right 
under article 21. The Committee noted that in restricting the right to freedom of 
assembly, Belarus must comply with the safeguards of necessity and 
proportionality incorporated in the Covenant. It particularly rejected the 
contention of Belarus that the measure has a legal backing since the law requires 
permission before conducting any procession.  
The argument of the Committee was that Belarus ‘has not attempted to 
explain why it was necessary –under domestic law and for one of the legitimate 
purposes set out in … the second sentence of article 21 of the Covenant– to 
obtain authorization prior to holding a peaceful street march in which only three 
persons intended to participate.’105 For such restriction to be justified, the 
Committee found that the state must go beyond citing a law that demands 
authorization by showing how ‘the movement of the author and his two 
acquaintances’ holding a flag along the pavement down a pedestrian street 
during daytime would have violated the rights and freedoms of others or would 
have posed a practical ‘threat to public safety or public order (ordre public)’.106 
This decision shows that the Committee demands states to strictly observe the 
requirement of proportionality whenever they restrict the right to freedom of 
assembly by law or its application. Hence, they must discharge their burden of 
establishing a link between the legitimate aims and the restrictions as well as the 
non-availability of other less prejudicial means for the right that s state seeks to 
limit. 
                                           
103 Id., para.2.8. 
104 Id., para 2.1. 
105 Id., para.7.5. 
106 Ibid.  
316                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 10, No.2                              December 2016  
 
 
A similar pronouncement was made by the Committee in the case, Sergey 
Kovalenko v Belarus.107  On October 30, 2007 the applicant was joined by thirty 
other people who also lost their families during the Stalin era which they 
characterized as repressive. Their plan was to move around the various places in 
the town of Vitebesk where their relatives were killed or buried and pay tribute 
to them particularly ‘to lay wreaths and flowers and to erect a cross.’108  By 
these gestures, they also wanted to show their disapproval of any form of 
political suppression or the silencing of dissent.109 This event was organized 
without seeking authorization from the city administration. Accordingly, after 
they finished their first commemoration in one of the places and boarding a bus 
to move to other places, the police arrested every participant on the allegation 
that they took part in a picket or stationary assembly which is not permitted by 
city officials. Subsequently, the organizer of the event Sergey was ordered by 
court to pay 620,000 Belarusian Rubles for his violation of the administrative 
law that requires seeking permission from authorities before conducting any 
form of assembly.110  Being upset with the finding of the court, the applicant 
submitted a case to the UN Human Rights Committee claiming violation of the 
right to freedom of assembly enshrined in the ICCPR. 
After a careful consideration of arguments of both parties, the Committee 
held in favour of the applicant and found Belarus responsible, inter alia, for 
violation of the right to freedom of assembly.111 The Committee reiterated its 
reasoning in the Igor Bazarov case (discussed above) by indicating that no 
evidence is adduced by the state which shows how the commemoration event 
actually endangers ‘national security or public safety, public order (ordre 
public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others’.112 The two decisions of the Committee (in the Igor 
Bazarov and Sergey Kovalenko cases) conform to the position held by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of assembly as well as by the Venice 
Commission of Experts. The decisions in both cases require states to refrain   
from dispersing spontaneous assemblies or gatherings with negligible number of 
participants by merely invoking failure to comply with a notification 
requirement as it violates the principle of proportionality.113 A similar ruling 
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was given by the African Commission in Malawi African Association and 
Others v. Mauritania.114 
The above decisions of the Committee have serious implications for Ethiopia 
as a state party to the ICCPR. This is because, the country has a bad reputation 
of dispersing gatherings conducted without compliance with the notification 
procedure and subjecting participants to criminal liability as noted in several 
parts of this article. The recent protest of a few Addis Ababa University students 
in front of the US Embassy115 shows the level of intolerance of Ethiopian 
authorities towards assemblies conducted without notice irrespective of whether 
they pose security risk or not. This protest was held on March 8, 2016 by 
disregarding the notification requirement set by the Demonstration and Public 
Political Meeting Proclamation and the number of participants was 20 (twenty).  
As the video footage of the demonstration shows, the students were expressing 
their disapproval of the government’s handling of the recent crisis in Oromia 
regional state in entirely peaceful manner.116 They were even carrying a white 
flag to demonstrate their peaceful intention. Since their number was few, they 
did not block the road nor prevent the free flow of cars and people. Yet, the 
authorities immediately arrested the students and criminal charges were pressed 
against them.  
The first count accused the students of violating Article 486(1) (a) of the 
FDRE Criminal Code which forbids assemblies conducted in violation of the 
law. Here, the contention of the prosecutor is that the students violated this 
article by failing to notify the city administration and for carrying out a 
demonstration in front of an Embassy in violation of the Demonstration and 
Public Political Meeting Proclamation.117  
In the second count, the prosecutor alleged that the students are responsible 
for spreading false rumours against the government and inciting the public by 
carrying placards118 such as “Schools are Knowledge Camps, not Military 
Camps”, “Stop the Genocide Against the Oromo People”, “The Government 
should take Responsibility for those Killed”, “Stop the Killings and Evictions”, 
“The Government should Withdraw its Military from Oromia Region”, “The 
Ethiopian Defense Force is terrorizing the Oromo People”, ‘‘Stop giving Lands 
to Investors while Citizens are Starved”, “The Government of America Should 
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be aware of Ethiopia’s Pseudo Democracy”119 in violation of Article 486(1) (a) 
of the FDRE Criminal Code. The third charge incriminated the students of 
infringing article 487(b) of the FDRE Criminal Code which prohibits inciting 
‘others to disobey orders issued by a lawful authority or to disobey laws or 
regulations duly promulgated’.120 The allegation of the prosecutor here is that 
with the intent of disobeying the law, students carried a placard which says “the 
Government of Ethiopia Should Amend the Anti Terrorism Law” and “Dissent 
is not Terrorism”121. 
The criminal proceeding against the students is undergoing during the 
writing up of this article. Yet, few remarks could be made on the rationality of 
the charges brought against them in light of their right to freedom of assembly 
and other related constitutional rights. From the perspective of the right to 
freedom of assembly recognized by the Constitution, none of the allegations 
made by the prosecution would hold water.  With regard to the first charge of 
demonstrations without giving notice in a prohibited place, the issue that arises 
is whether the restriction provided by the Public Demonstration Proclamation is 
appropriate. Specifically, the issue would be whether the law is reasonable in 
requiring notification for assemblies of a few participants (i.e., 20 in the case at 
hand) where such events do not pose danger to public peace, order or free flow 
of traffic. The purpose of notification is to facilitate assemblies, and such 
requirement would be cumbersome to uphold considering their right to freedom 
of assembly. Blanket ban on demonstrations before embassies without further 
qualification is unduly burdensome to demonstrators especially where their 
messages target at the officials in the premises of the Embassy. 
Regarding the second accusation against them which is inciting the public 
and spreading false rumours against the government, it also does not make much 
sense. Content based limitation on participants exercising their right to freedom 
of assembly is only allowed if it is proved that they have made an unequivocal 
call for war or hatred.122 Apart from such cases, the right of demonstrators to 
criticize the actions or policies of the government is fully protected by their right 
to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. The prime objective of these 
rights is to protect such views from unnecessary attack as long as they are 
expressed in a democratic and peaceful manner which seems to be the case. 
None of the messages included in the placards they carried even remotely call 
for violence or hatred. The sole claim of the prosecutor’s charge is that what 
they are stating is false. For instance, the placard that regards Ethiopia’s pledges 
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to democracy as “Pseudo Democracy” is the expression of what the 
demonstrators genuinely believe to be the case based on their observations. 
The government may believe that it is exercising a genuine democracy and it 
might consider the statements of the students as false. But is it fair to criminalize 
expression on a contestable issue such as the prevalence of democracy in 
Ethiopia solely because the statement is considered as false from the 
government’s point of view?  Is it not too cumbersome to demand citizens to 
keep quiet unless they are hundred percent sure that what they are saying is true 
from the government’s standpoint? Would this ever be possible in constitutional 
democracy that upholds fundamental rights? I argue that this should not be the 
case because citizens must be allowed to say what they genuinely believe in 
without being required to prove its absolute veracity. A government may not 
agree with what every citizen says, but it should not criminalize citizens for 
saying so. Otherwise, recognizing freedom of assembly and expression become 
superfluous. 
The third count of the prosecution accuses the students of inciting non-
observance of the anti-terrorism law by openly calling the government for its 
amendment.123 One does not see the link between how the request for 
amendment of the law could be equated with a call for its disobedience. A 
number of important questions might ensue. Is it fair to criminalize citizens just 
for demanding an amendment of a law on anti-terrorism? What is wrong with 
even asking for the amendment of the Constitution or its replacement with 
another one so long as it is done in a democratic and peaceful manner? Overall, 
the outright criminalization of assemblies conducted in the absence of 
notification without risk of public order or peace in Ethiopia is inconsistent with 
the interpretation of the UN Human Rights Committee regarding freedom of 
assembly as envisaged in the ICCPR. Accordingly, it is time for Ethiopia to 
revisit its laws and practices on freedom of assembly and ensure their 
conformity with the country’s obligations under international human rights 
treaties such as the ICCPR.  
5.  ‘Place, Time and Manner Restrictions’ on Assemblies  
The other cluster of limitations that adversely affects the exercise of the right to 
freedom of assembly is the one connected with place, time and manner. Two 
forms of restrictions are envisaged in the Proclamation concerning the venue of 
conducting assembly. The first is an outright or blanket restriction on 
undertaking demonstrations or political meetings within 100 meters from the 
places identified as prohibited.124 A long list of such venues is provided in the 
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Proclamation which includes embassies, international organizations, hospitals, 
graveyards, churches, mosques, prayer houses, electric power houses, dams and 
‘unsuitable’ market places on market days inter alia.125 Such blanket venue 
restrictions are regarded improper by the UN Special Rapporeur on the right to 
freedom of assembly.126 Further, no assembly could be conducted within 500 
meter radius of detention centers, offices belonging to the military, or security 
personnel.127 These place restrictions are very broad and one may need to go to 
the wilderness to conduct an assembly if these restrictions are to be applied 
strictly without any proportionality considerations. 
The Proclamation also gives a wide range of power to municipalities to seek 
postponement of time or relocation  of place by citing concerns of peace, 
security and  ensuring the continuation of people’s ‘daily life’ without any 
‘disruption’.128 The manner in which the restriction is crafted is susceptible to 
wide interpretations especially in the Amharic version of the Proclamation. It 
states that the municipalities may recommend that it is preferable to undertake 
the assembly another time or place by stating their justifications.129 Here, it is 
important to bear in mind the distinction between a decision and a 
recommendation, the latter being non-binding. According to this interpretation 
organizers could disregard the suggestion of the administration as it lacks 
binding force.  
On the other hand, the provision which allows a recommendation in the 
beginning, states decision in the end, by stating that the municipalities cannot do 
ban the conducting of an assembly at any time or place.130 A logical 
interpretation of the second part of the provision leads to the conclusion that, the 
city administration is at liberty to decide on postponement of time or changing 
of venue as often as it wants save for total prohibition of an assembly. The 
second line of interpretation seems to be the one agreeable to the municipalities 
of Ethiopia. Because, what they frequently do is ask organizers to relocate place 
or postpone date of the assembly upon receipt of notification by raising several 
concerns.131 If the decision is not accepted by the organizers they will refuse to 
endorse submitted notification which makes the planned assembly illegal. The 
following examples demonstrate this problem. 
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An open sky demonstration was organized by Semayawi Party (The Blue 
Party) together with other opposition parties on November 25, 2014.132 The 
organizers submitted their notification to Addis Ababa City Administration. 
However, it declined to allow the assembly by alleging ‘security force shortage 
as there are other scheduled events.’133 It further advised the organizers to 
conduct an indoor assembly as an alternative. The organizers were not 
convinced with the justifications provided by the authorities after the expiry of 
the 12 hour period set by the law and proceeded with the assembly as planned. 
Then, the city administration quickly broke the gathering by deploying police 
force immediately. It also characterized the event as an ‘anti-constitutional 
activity’.134  
The coalition of parties submitted another notification to conduct a 24 hour 
demonstration at Meskel Square set to begin on December 8, 2014 and to finish 
on December 9, 2014 mid day.135 What makes this demonstration interesting 
was the day selected for its undertaking, i.e. December 8 which coincides with 
Nations and Nationalities day celebrated nationally. Some contend that the 
organizers chose this date on purpose to irritate the current government that 
celebrates this day, yet others say it is accidental.136 Leaving this aside, the city 
administration rejected to approve the notification as it did in the past. Its 
justification this time was ‘the increased traffic [in the square] due to ongoing 
construction activities.’137 This was followed by a statement by the government 
on national TV that warned the organizers to refrain from conducting the 
assembly as planned. Nonetheless, the coalition of parties defied the decision of 
the city administration and proceeded with the gathering until the police 
detained more than 75 participants including the leaders of different opposition 
parties.138 They were later accused of ‘outrage against the Constitution’ ‘rioting’ 
and ‘inciting terror and chaos.’139  
Moreover, the recent controversy between the Ethiopian Federal Democratic 
Unity Forum (MEDREK) which is a consortium of several opposition parties 
and the Addis Ababa City Administration further illustrate the magnitude of the 
problem. What caused the dispute was the refusal of the city administration to 
approve a notification submitted by the party for conducting demonstration on 
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three separate occasions.140 The party first notified the authorities of its intent to 
organize a peaceful procession on Sunday December 27, 2015. It also indicated 
the route that starts at a place called Afencho Ber passing through Ras Mekonnen 
Bridge, Churchill road and ending at tiglachen statute or Ethio-Cuba Friendship 
Park. The purpose of the march was to condemn the killing of protestors in the 
Oromia regional state and pay tribute for the dead.141 As noted time and again, 
the city administration refused to acknowledge the undertaking of the 
procession. Its justification for cancelling the procession was the presence of 
several higher learning and government institutions in the route chosen for the 
march, traffic congestion and the current situation of the country.142 These 
grounds were not convincing for the leaders of the party and they characterized 
them as ‘irrelevant and petty.’143 Nonetheless, the administration stated that it 
will give approval to a demonstration that will be organized in another place 
‘with no traffic congestion.’144  
Accordingly, MEDREK presented another letter of notification to the city 
administration to conduct a procession on January 17, 2016. This time they 
chose another place as per the instruction of the administration but the objective 
of the march was the same as the one rejected earlier. The planned procession 
was set to start from Ginfile River and end at a place usually called Sholla Yeka 
Epiphany celebration place.145 Yet again, the city administration rejected the 
undertaking of the procession as the time and place chosen by the organizer is 
not agreeable to it because of the upcoming Epiphany holiday will be celebrated 
at the place chosen for demonstration. It further said that several international 
meetings including that of the African Union would be held in the same time 
and the timing of the procession is not acceptable.146  After hearing the response 
of the administration, the organizers noted that such decisions could only be 
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interpreted as absence of good faith on the part of the authorities and their 
unwillingness to allow the exercise of the constitutional right to freedom of 
assembly.   
They particularly underscored the fact that the day chosen for procession in 
both cases was Sunday where there is no traffic congestion and the public 
institutions and schools are closed on that day.147 Concerning the Epiphany 
holiday, they said it was going to be celebrated three days after the planned 
demonstration and it is difficult to imagine how it could be a sufficient reason 
for banning the procession. The same is true for the said African Union meeting 
as it was due to be held fifteen days after the planned date of procession.148 
Despite successive rejections, MEDREK submitted another notification to 
conduct a peaceful gathering at Meskel square on Sunday February 14, 2016. 
According to the organizers, the administration kept quiet this time but they 
received a threat from the police informally which made them to cancel the 
gathering. They further noted their frustration with the decision of the 
administration saying MEDREK’s existence as a political party would be 
meaningless without freedom of assembly. The leaders of the party particularly 
said: ‘if we are prevented from all this, then what instrument is left for us to 
remain politically active and visible as a political organization?’149    
The problems discussed in the preceding paragraphs raise several issues, the 
first being whether the authorities should have unlimited power to postpone time 
or change the venue for a planned assembly. To address this issue, it is 
important to bear in mind that one component of the right to freedom of 
assembly is the entitlement of organizers to choose the place and time they think 
is appropriate for achieving their purpose unless there is an overriding concern.  
A corollary of such entitlement is that authorities cannot arbitrarily make time 
and place restrictions as they wish by mentioning insignificant concerns.  
On this issue, the UN Special Rapporteur and Venice Commission of Experts 
underscore that time and place restriction should take into account the principle 
of proportionality which requires legitimate aim, suitability, necessity and 
weighing the cost as well as the benefits of restriction.150 As such, a decision to 
postpone the assembly to another time or place must be made after due 
consideration of several factors, i.e. only when it is not possible to address the 
concern by using another measure which is less restrictive. Further, they noted 
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that organizers are not obliged to comply with the suggestion of the authorities 
regarding alternative place and time for conducting the assembly if it 
undermines the ‘essence’ of the gathering.151  
A good example in this regard could be the suggestion of the Addis Ababa 
City Administration to Semayawi Party to conduct an indoor meeting in a hall 
instead of undertaking a demonstration in Meskel Square. Such alternatives 
obviously erode the essence of the gathering since the purpose and effect of an 
open sky demonstration and a meeting in a closed hall cannot be identical. This 
is because freedom of assembly includes a right of undertaking a demonstration 
within ‘sight and sound’ of its target audience.152 Hence, whenever the 
administration seeks to apply time and place restriction –including 
postponement or relocation– it must go through every step in the scrutiny of 
proportionality to ensure the legitimacy of the measure. 
The same position is reflected in the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights 
Committee. In Denis Turchenyak v Belarus,153 the applicants sought the 
permission of Brest City Administration for conducting a picket of 10 people for 
three days from 1 pm to 3 pm in an area reserved for pedestrians. The city 
administration rejected their application by citing a bylaw which designates 
‘Lokomotive Stadium’ as the only place of undertaking a picket.154 Courts also 
affirmed the decision of the authorities as appropriate. This forced the applicants 
to approach the UN Human Rights Committee alleging the violation of their 
right to freedom of assembly.  
Their main contention was, the alternative place available for them is an 
‘isolated location in a stadium that is surrounded by a concrete wall’ which 
detaches them from their target audience making their whole activity futile.155 
The Committee endorsed their argument by reasoning that the place restriction 
of the authorities on the applicants is capricious and disproportionate since it 
was imposed without showing ‘how a picket held in the said location would 
necessarily jeopardize national security, public safety, public order, the 
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.’ 156  
This would take us to another related question whether there should be a 
hierarchy among different uses of public spaces like streets, parks or squares.  
The other question is whether the utilization of public places for conducting 
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gatherings is of secondary importance compared to other uses such as traffic, 
trade fairs or celebration of religious festivals.  Addressing these issues is very 
crucial since the practice in Ethiopia seems to favour the use of public places for 
other purposes than for conducting demonstration and public political meetings. 
As noted in different parts of this article, the Addis Ababa City Administration 
has repeatedly cancelled various notifications for conducting demonstrations by 
raising concerns for the smooth flow of traffic or the occupation of these places 
by other activities such as trade exhibition of micro-enterprises and giving an 
outright priority for the latter.157 
Such practice is contrary to the recommendation of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to freedom of assembly and Venice Commission of 
Experts. Both authorities underscore the need to give equal value for the 
utilization of public spaces for assemblies by stating that ‘the free flow of traffic 
should not automatically take precedence over freedom of peaceful 
assembly.’158 The Venice Commission of Experts further notes that ‘assemblies 
are as much a legitimate use of public space as commercial activity and the 
movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic.’159 As such, administrative 
officials must not consider assemblies as having a secondary importance which 
could be easily forfeited whenever a competing use arises. Such approach 
violates the proportionality that must be observed whenever freedom of 
assembly is restricted. Hence, the municipality is duty bound to come up with a 
mechanism to reconcile various uses instead of invariably choosing to sacrifice 
the undertaking of assemblies for the sake of other uses. For instance, concerns 
of traffic flow could easily be addressed by ‘rerouting pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic in a certain area.’160  
It is also important to bear in mind that, any restriction imposed on freedom 
of assembly should be in line with ideals of democracy as enshrined in the 
FDRE Constitution and ICCPR.161 The hallmark of a democratic society is its 
tolerance of minor inconveniences and its ability to accommodate various 
legitimate interests without imposing unnecessary burden on some for the sake 
of others. Authorities regulating freedom of assembly need to appreciate that ‘in 
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a democratic society, the urban space is not only an area for circulation, but also 
for participation.’162 This shows that the provision of the Ethiopian assembly 
law that gives municipalities the power to restrict assemblies as they wish on 
account of preventing ‘disruption of ordinary life of the people’163 must be 
qualified as it is inherently disproportionate. This is because it is impossible to 
conduct gathering free from any inconvenience to the public in some way. The 
consideration must rather be whether such nuisance is bearable in a democratic 
society founded on respect for fundamental freedoms. Thus, unless the 
participants of the assembly resort to violence ‘it is important for public 
authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings.’164 
This would take us to another related issue regarding the manner restrictions 
on freedom of assembly (i.e. restrictions related to the manner of participants in 
the assembly). As noted earlier, peacefulness constitutes a core element of the 
right to freedom of assembly that bestows the right a protected status. So it is 
only logical if authorities take measure against assemblies that are imminent 
threat to peace and security. It is also acceptable if the law bans assemblies and 
gatherings that incite racial hatred or discrimination which undermines the right 
of others enshrined in Ethiopian assembly law.165  
Yet, restrictions related to the manner of participants (i.e. manner 
restrictions) imposed by administrative officials need to be subjected to 
proportionality test to avoid unnecessary limitations. Contrary to this principle, 
some municipalities in Ethiopia seek organizers to secure the peacefulness of 
assembly in advance as a pre-condition for allowing the gathering to proceed.166  
Such restriction is too cumbersome on organizers. According to the UN Special 
Rapporteur on freedom of assembly, what organizers need to demonstrate is 
their intention to conduct the assembly in a peaceful manner.167 Hence, asking 
them to guarantee the peacefulness in advance does not seem appropriate 
because it is the state that has the primary duty as well as power to do so. If any 
duty is to be imposed on organizers it should be that of assisting state security 
officers in ensuring the smooth running of the assembly.  
The state’s positive obligation of facilitating assemblies to ensure its peaceful 
completion is particularly relevant for Ethiopia. This is because; most 
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demonstrations are dispersed by the police citing incidence of violence.168  
Often, few individuals participating in a demonstration will start throwing 
stones or provoke the crowd towards violent action. It is difficult to know 
whether these persons are sent by the state itself or not. The usual approach of 
security personnel is to disperse the assembly immediately irrespective of the 
magnitude of violence.169 Such dispersal orders violate the principle of 
proportionality. As recommended by the UN Special Rapporteur and Venice 
Commission of Experts, security personnel should react by singling out 
provocateurs or those who disturb instead of dispersing the whole assembly.170 
Such measures will help peaceful participants of the assembly to proceed with 
their demonstration until the very end. 
The Proclamation regulating assemblies in Ethiopia says nothing about the 
type of weapon that should be utilized by security personnel. However, ‘the only 
circumstance warranting the use of firearms, including during demonstrations, is 
the imminent threat of death or serious injury.’171 Hence, security forces should 
not start firing whenever they see some degree of violence in an undergoing 
protest. They are rather expected to show more tolerance towards the 
demonstrators by considering the importance of the right to freedom of 
assembly and other fundamental rights. As such, what they should do primarily 
is facilitate the peacefulness of the assembly by picking out those who are 
utilizing violent means and by using the least harmful but effective force 
possible.172 This would make the measure legitimate, suitable, less intrusive and 
proportional. However, if life or body is subjected to serious danger, that is 
about to happen, the use of more force on by the police would be tolerated so 
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6. Public Peace, Public Safety and Public Order Restrictions  
The grounds of public peace, safety and order are considered legitimate for 
limiting the right to freedom of assembly in many jurisdictions including 
Ethiopia. However, the application of these grounds needs to be scrutinized 
properly to prevent their unjustified use in restricting peaceful gatherings. 
Ethiopian courts lag behind Kenyan courts in this regard. Kenyan courts are 
becoming active in discharging their constitutional duty ‘to hear and determine 
applications for redress of a denial, violation or infringement of, or threat to, a 
right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights’173 including the right to 
freedom of assembly. The following two cases pertaining to freedom of 
assembly demonstrate how Kenyan courts are utilizing the proportionality test 
incorporated in the Constitution for reviewing legislative or the executive 
restrictions imposed on an assembly. 
In Eugene Wamalwa v. Minister for State for Internal Security,174 the 
applicant Mr. Walmalwa was an elected member of the Kenyan national 
assembly from the Sabouti constituency who was also interested in running for 
presidency in the 2012 presidential election.  He chose ‘Kamukinji Grounds’ as 
a place to officially begin his election campaign.175 Subsequently, as per the 
requirement of the Kenyan Public Order Act, he submitted a notice of intent of 
organizing such event at ‘Kamukunji Grounds’ on January 29, 2011 from 10 am 
to 6 pm.176 He further sought the cooperation of the security personnel to ensure 
the peaceful undertaking of the political meeting. In the meantime, the applicant 
continued to make other necessary arrangements such as advertisement and 
preparation of posters by allocating around 1 Million Kenyan Shillings.  
The response of the authorities came fifteen days after the submission of the 
notice and four days before the undertaking of the planned event. Their decision 
was to ban the planned political meeting by expressing their fear that “members 
of an unlawful group known as ‘the Mungiki’ may attend the meeting and 
disrupt public order in Nairobi”.177 They further noted that allowing the political 
meeting to proceed will also endanger ‘the rights and fundamental freedoms of 
others’.178 Hence, the planned gathering was cancelled. 
Upset by the verdict of the police, the applicant approached the High Court 
in Nairobi alleging the violation of his right to freedom of assembly enshrined 
under article 37 of the Kenyan Constitution.  Before it proceeded to resolving 
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the dispute, the court underscored that the right to freedom of assembly could 
not be restricted in the absence of proportionality considerations laid down in 
article 24 of the Kenyan supreme law.179  More importantly, the court held that 
the ‘state should not be allowed to suppress the freedom of assembly without 
sufficient and genuine reasons.’180 It further suggested that if people are denied 
their right to assemble peacefully and express their view, they might be pushed 
to resort to other violent means.181  
It held that the reason provided by the state for cancelling the gathering was 
not convincing and sufficient. This is because the alleged threat is something 
which is within the capacity of the state to be averted. The court further stated 
that the cancellation of the assembly on ground of security ‘is tantamount to 
admitting that the State is incapable of dealing with members of outlawed 
groups or sects, which is not the case.’182 From this decision, one can see that 
the court made an exalting scrutiny to determine whether or not the ground 
mentioned by the authorities for restricting freedom of assembly is proportional. 
It particularly shows the failure of the state to meet the necessity element since 
the security issue could be addressed by less restrictive means than entirely 
cancelling the assembly thereby causing significant impairment to the right. 
In Randu Nzai Ruwa & two Others v. Internal Security Minister,183 the 
applicants were members of Mombasa Republican Council which was declared 
by the Kenyan government as a criminal organization in accordance with the 
law regulating organized crime.184 The justification provided by the government 
for taking the measure was that, the council is not registered as an association 
and it propagates a secessionist agenda contrary to the Kenyan Constitution 
which proclaims Kenya as ‘one indivisible sovereign state.’185 The applicants 
challenged the decision of the Kenyan government –to dissolve the association– 
as incompatible with their right to freedom of association and assembly 
recognized under the Kenyan Constitution. 
Before giving its verdict, the court noted that the rights to freedom of 
association and assembly are indispensable tools for exercising all political 
rights.186 Then, the court went on to determine whether these rights are violated. 
The court noted that outlawing the association clearly infringes the right to 
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freedom of assembly and association.187 However, since these rights are not 
absolute, the court went further to assess whether the infringement was justified 
and reasonable. To arrive at its conclusion, the court referred to the limitation 
clause of the Constitution which states that any restriction must be ‘reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society’.188 It further underscored the 
fact that ‘democracy is meaningless without tolerance’.189 In effect, the court 
expressed the importance of having tolerance towards hearing different 
viewpoints including those propagating secession, no matter how much the 
majority disagrees with them.  
The court stated that advocating a secessionist agenda is not in itself a threat 
to public security or peace so long as the proponents want to achieve their end 
through peaceful and democratic means.190 Since secession is not entertained 
under Kenya’s current constitutional framework, executing such idea needs 
constitutional amendment which has to follow the necessary procedure.191 Yet, 
promoting such idea alone is not a sufficient reason to deny recognition to the 
association. The court found that the measure taken by the Kenyan government 
violates the principle of proportionality since it chose the most restrictive 
method of dealing with the problem which is a total ban.192  
Instead of such measures, the court suggested for controlling the activities of 
the organization through appropriate registration or imposition of criminal 
liability on members of the association who engage in violence, thereby 
pursuing a less restrictive means of preventing the feared risk to national 
security.193 This decision is very instructive for countries like Ethiopia which 
take serious measures against political organizations have different positions on 
matters stipulated in the FDRE Constitution. As long as individuals or 
association utilize peaceful means and abide by rules of democracy, they should 
be allowed to assemble and express ideas even if the views may not be favoured 
by the current constitutional framework. The public can then be left free to 
decide whether or not these ideas are acceptable and beneficial without 
unnecessary involvement of the government. 
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7. Decision Making Procedure and Judicial/Administrative 
Review 
7.1 Decision Making Procedure 
Most of the problems associated with the notification of assemblies in Ethiopia 
and the restrictions related to place, time and manner could have easily been 
resolved had the existing implementing law on freedom of assembly provided 
for a clear, transparent and inclusive procedure of decision making. The 
Proclamation governing Peaceful Demonstration and Public Political Meetings 
rather makes the municipalities or local authorities sole decision makers in the 
process without the need to involve organizers.194 The organizers are not 
allowed to have a say in the decision making process pertaining to assemblies or 
restrictions imposed on them as of right. What the law entitles them to is to 
merely get reasoned decision within the time prescribed by law.195 This would 
make the decision unfair from a procedural point of view since it is made 
without adequate hearing. 
Such practices and procedures are regarded as inappropriate by the Venice 
Committee of Experts who underscore the importance of ensuring ‘that the 
decision-making and review process is fair and transparent.’196 They contend 
that the right to freedom of assembly bestows upon the organizers ‘full rights to 
participate in any hearing that takes place’, and that such hearing is required if 
‘limitations or a prohibition are being proposed’.197 Hence, any decision 
rendered without involving the organizers of the gathering violates the right to 
freedom of assembly.  
The Committee of Experts has also given an illustration of what constitutes 
adequate participation in decisions that have a limiting implication for 
assemblies. These include the right of organizers to be represented by a lawyer 
in the decision making process and to adduce any evidence that support their 
claim be it an oral testimony or documentary evidence.198  These entitlements 
are very crucial in the decision making proceedings applicable to assemblies 
since they ensure the fairness of the process and enhance the possibility of 
making the right decision. Hence, Ethiopia should consider incorporating these 
procedures in its law that regulates assemblies. 
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7.2 Judicial or Administrative Review 
Another big lacuna in the Ethiopian law of assemblies is the absence of any 
administrative or judicial mechanism that reviews the decision of authorities 
imposing limitations on peaceful demonstrations or political meetings. As far as 
the Proclamation is concerned, the decision of the municipalities/local 
administration on accepted notifications or related limitations thereof is final. 
This is very dangerous because it gives wide discretionary power to authorities 
to restrict freedom of assembly for whatever reason they think is appropriate 
since there is no mechanism to hold them accountable. What is striking here is 
that, despite numerous problems and ineffectiveness of notifications for holding 
assemblies in Ethiopia, no single application for the review of such decisions 
has been submitted to courts. What the organizers have done in this respect so 
far is issuance of statements threatening authorities that they will challenge the 
decisions in a court of law without actually doing so.199  They have also made a 
few attempts to seek review of such decisions by higher officials of the city 
administration in an informal manner.200 
There are other complex issues concerning the role of courts in the 
interpretation of constitutional rights in Ethiopia including the right to freedom 
of assembly. On the one hand, the Constitution obliges courts at federal and 
state levels ‘to respect and enforce’ fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined 
in the Constitution.201 On the other hand, the Constitution reserves the power of 
interpreting the ‘constitutional disputes’ to the House of Federation which 
represents the Nation and Nationalities of Ethiopia.202 This stipulation has been 
misconceived by members of the judiciary as precluding courts from entertaining 
any claim that is principally based on the Constitution.203 Hence, judges 
subscribing to this view have opted to send various cases to the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry merely because the Constitution is invoked as the primary 
legal basis.204 
Such practice is strongly criticized by some scholars with whom the author 
agrees. For instance, Takele argues that it is a ‘literal’ and extended 
interpretation of the term ‘constitutional dispute’ that led to the absurd scenario 
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in which courts have little say in entertaining cases of constitutional 
importance.205 Accordingly, he argues for a restrictive understanding of 
‘constitutional disputes’ which fall under the jurisdiction of the House of 
Federation.206  Such a dispute arises only when the judge on whose bench a 
constitutional case appears is faced with two or more constitutionally sound 
interpretations of a certain constitutional clause or article, during which he/she 
must refer the case to the House of Federation for decision.207 As Takele duly 
notes, such construction ensures harmony among different provisions and gives 
effect for all. 
Not every dispute or controversy raised by the parties over the meaning of a 
constitutional provision or clause in concrete cases will automatically deprive 
the court its mandate to entertain the case. If the judges could easily resolve the 
issues by undertaking a coherent scrutiny of the Constitution, then there is no 
constitutional controversy and the case ends there. The remedy for the parties 
will be appeal. It is to be noted that, a constitutional case involves ‘constitutional 
dispute’ only when –after due consideration of several issues, the court is of the 
opinion that there are more than one equally legitimate interpretations of the 
contested constitutional provision which are in line with its purpose. Such cases 
involve constitutional controversy and thus fall under the realm of the House of 
Federation.208 
This interpretation is in line with the duty of the court (stipulated under the 
Constitution) to ensure the observance and enforcement of human rights 
recognized by it including the right to freedom of assembly. It would also make 
the provision of the Constitution –that provides all people ‘the right to bring 
justiciable matters to court of law’– meaningful.209 Hence, decisions restricting 
freedom of assembly are justiciable matters that could be resolved by courts by 
examining national and international laws including the Constitution. 
Furthermore, the duty of the judiciary to enforce human rights recognized by the 
Constitution should include its obligation to explicate the content of the right to 
freedom of assembly by referring to treaties ratified by Ethiopia. Such duty 
should also be extended to determining the appropriateness of restrictions 
imposed on the right to freedom of assembly (by authorities in Ethiopia) in light 
of constitutional and international standards. In the absence of such authority, 
courts cannot legitimately claim to be guardians of fundamental rights enshrined 
in the Constitution. 
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The proclamation establishing federal courts in Ethiopia (i.e. Federal Courts 
Proclamation No. 25/1996) recognizes the power of courts to enforce 
fundamental rights incorporated in the Constitution since it gives them material 
jurisdiction to entertain any case ‘arising from the Constitution or federal 
law’.210 Hence, a person claiming the violation of his right to freedom of 
assembly by arbitrary decision of municipalities could rightly approach courts as 
his claim is founded on the Constitution. They also have a duty to hear and 
decide cases. The phrase ‘case arising from the federal law’ may evoke 
arguments because the current legal regime applicable for regulation of 
assemblies was adopted during the transitional period and before the adoption of 
the present Constitution and the federal structure. However, considering its 
application at the national level to date, one can regard it as federal law and say 
that federal courts or regional courts by way of delegation have the right to 
entertain cases pertaining to the right to freedom of assembly. 
The next question would be which kind of courts i.e. administrative or 
ordinary courts should resolve assembly related cases. On this issue, the practice 
of other countries shows that some have chosen the former and others the latter 
as mentioned by the study of the UN Special Rapporteur and Venice Committee 
experts.211 What is important for both bodies is having an opportunity to ‘appeal 
before an independent and impartial court, which should take a decision 
promptly’.212 It is also important to clearly state this right in the law regulating 
freedom of assembly. Hence, Ethiopia should fill the lacuna in its assembly law 
by clearly incorporating the right to appeal of organizers of an assembly against 
any decision they think is an arbitrary restriction of the right to freedom of 
assembly. The nature of the remedy could be an injunction order or a monetary 
compensation if civil damage is sustained. Besides, national human rights 
institutions such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the Ethiopian 
Institution of Ombudsman should provide an additional oversight over 
discretionary administrative decisions pertaining to the right to freedom of 
assembly since they have the constitutional duty to ensure protection to the right 
to freedom of assembly.  
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8. The Role of Political Will in Safeguarding the Right to 
Freedom of Assembly  
The preceding sections have shown the gaps in the legal landscape governing 
the right to freedom of assembly in Ethiopia, problems associated with its 
implementation and best practices in other jurisdictions. The discussion on these 
issues serves as a basis for the question as to how we can change this situation 
by addressing the problems. A very important factor in this regard is political 
will towards promoting good governance, ensuring rule of law and strengthening 
democratic institutions. This is very critical because the challenges discussed in 
the preceding sections are not only attributable to the lacunae in the Constitution 
and the legislation regulating freedom of assembly. Even the best constitutional 
and statutory protection afforded to the right to freedom of assembly might not 
guarantee adequate realization of the right on the ground. In other words, 
constitutional and legislative gaps have certain contributions but everything 
cannot be attributed to them. Thus, we need to inquire further and ask other 
fundamental questions concerning factors that could hinder legislative reform 
and its implementation.  
These questions may include the reason/s for (a) the failure of the 
government/legislature to enact a law which better safeguards the right to 
freedom of assembly; (b) unfettered arbitrary power of institutions regulating 
freedom of assembly without accountability; (c) gross failure of courts (whose 
independence is formally guaranteed by the Constitution) in discharging their 
constitutional duty of defending the right to freedom of assembly when it is 
restricted; (d) the indifference of courts when the right to freedom of assembly 
is curtailed; (e) the failure of the national human rights institutions (established 
by the Constitution) to guard against the encroachment of the right; and (f) 
failure of the media and civil society to play their roles toward ensuring the 
protection of the right. In sum, there is the need to inquire into the core factor 
that is preventing democratic institutions recognized by the Constitution such as 
parliament, courts, national human rights institutions (such as the Ethiopian 
Human Rights Commission), media’s and civil society from defending the 
protection of fundamental rights including freedom of assembly. As elaborated 
in the following paragraphs, the main factor which explains many of these 
questions is the lack of political will of those who hold political power towards 
good governance, rule of law and functioning of strong democratic institutions.  
In his message for the 2013 world human rights day, the UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon underscored the importance of political will on the part of 
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states to ensure the adequate protection of human rights.213 Post et al define 
political will as ‘the extent of committed support among key decision makers for 
a particular policy solution to a particular problem’.214 They identify the key 
decision makers as elected or appointed officials who formulate and make the 
final policy decision on certain matters.215 Depending on the democratic nature 
of the regime, the decision maker could be a single person or group of persons 
or shared among the different branches of government in a proportionate 
manner as envisaged in democratic regimes.  
The first element in political will relates to the manner of elections and 
appointments. Factors like the presidential or parliamentary nature of 
government, its unitary or federal character, the practice of single party or multi-
party system are also crucial in determining key decision makers.216 Applying 
these criteria may shed some light in answering who is holding the key power of 
making important decisions in Ethiopia. The answer to this question is central to 
address the role of political will in realizing fundamental rights including the 
right to freedom of assembly. Constitutionally speaking Ethiopia is a federal 
state in which power is apportioned between the federal and state 
governments.217 Beside horizontal division, the Constitution also apportions key 
powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the 
government.218 The Constitution also dictates for a parliamentary democracy 
with multiple parties.219  
However, examining the practice may lead to a totally different conclusion. 
In practice it is often the federal government that makes important decisions for 
the central government as well as for members of the federation.220 Even among 
the federal government organs, the power relationship is not balanced. Hence, 
too much power is concentrated in the hands of the executive and the parliament 
compared to the weak judicial organ. Consequently, the judiciary is unable to 
exercise a strong oversight over their activities.221 With regard to political 
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parties, even if Ethiopia is constitutionally a multi-party state, it has been a 
single party state de facto for the past 25 years. This has resulted in the blending 
of the executive branch and the ruling party. Hence, arguably, one can consider 
the Executive Committee of the ruling political party EPRDF (Ethiopian 
Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front) as the key decision maker in present 
day Ethiopia. 222 
The second element in political will requires the decision makers’ 
understanding ‘that a particular issue or condition has reached problem status’ 
and thereupon ‘agree on the nature of the problem, and that the problem requires 
government action’.223 For our purpose, the issue which needs adequate 
government attention or political will is ensuring good governance, observing 
rule of law and preserving strong democratic institutions in general and 
protecting the right to freedom of assembly in particular without which 
sustainable peace and development are unthinkable.   
Good governance is a broad concept and it includes a number of elements 
within its ambit including rule of law and strong democratic institutions. In the 
general sense it may be construed as ‘principles of accountability, participation, 
transparency and rule of law’.224 In the particular sense it means, ‘free, fair and 
frequent election; representative legislature that makes laws and provides 
oversight; an independent judiciary that interpret laws; … guarantee of human 
rights and rule of law; and …transparent and accountable institutions’.225 
Decentralization of power and engaging civil society in decision making process 
is also an attribute of governance that is good.226  
The policy decisions made on these critical issues by the key decision makers 
will have a negative or positive impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of 
assembly. If they decide to conduct free and fair elections and abide by rule of 
law as stipulated in the Constitution, a representative parliament will be 
established. This parliament will be guided by rule of law, not rule by law. This 
means, the legislature will not rush into adopting whatever law is proposed by 
the executive or its members. It will rather seriously consider the human right 
implications of the laws that it adopts, and makes sure that every law it makes 
will not infringe them in a disproportional manner.227 Such policy decisions will 
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better safeguard the right to freedom of assembly and pave the way for the 
adoption of a right friendly law. 
Likewise, if the key decision makers decide to give complete autonomy and 
operating space for democratic institutions such as courts, national human right 
institutions, media and civil society, freedom of assembly would be guarded by 
these actors from arbitrary encroachment. Further, if decision makers make 
accountability and transparency their number one priority, the institutions 
regulating freedom of assembly would take extra care not to infringe the right 
and provide sufficient justifications when they do so. The central question here 
is whether the key decision maker in Ethiopia i.e. EPRDF regards issues of good 
governance and democracy as matters worthy of governmental action. Although 
the party has (on several occasions) stated the gaps  in good governance and its 
willingness to address them,228 it has failed to take crucial policy decisions of 
good governance in a manner that would have ensured better protection of 
human rights in general and the right to freedom of assembly in particular. 
Further, it is not clear how good governance, democracy and rule of law are 
understood by the party.  
The third and most important component of political will refers to the 
commitment of the decision makers. According to Post et al, the heart of 
political will is commitment on the part of the decision makers ‘in supporting a 
particular policy’.229 The central question would be why the leaders of the ruling 
party who are the key decision makers in Ethiopia are not showing a strong 
support or commitment to address the serious issue of good governance, rule of 
law, democratic institutions and respect for human rights including freedom of 
assembly? This question is important because the ruling party often admits the 
gaps in good governance and makes pledges to take certain measures to improve 
the situation, but we do not often see the promised changes in practice.   
On this point, Post et al provide two factors which might force the decision 
makers to be committed to the pledged measure. The first is fear of 
‘reputational cost’ due to which decision makers might be committed to pursue 
a certain policy measure because failure to bring the promised changes will 
damage their image in the eyes of the public.230 In other words, they will lose 
credibility in the public and no one will take their pledges seriously. Based on 
the observation of this author, the ruling party has made so many promises to 
bring reforms of good governance and rule of law, but has failed to deliver them 
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in a tangible manner. The second factor (identified by Post et al) which forces 
decision makers to be committed towards a certain measure is the pressure of 
accountability to the general public.231  This presupposes the existence of free 
and fair election and multi party-democracy. In such systems, if the decision 
makers fail to show commitment towards certain policy measures that are 
desired by the public, it will replace them with another party in the next election. 
This is a strong incentive for decision makers to show strong commitment for 
their pledges in democratic regimes. But this does not seem to be relevant for 
Ethiopia because the ruling party has no reasonable fear that it will be replaced 
by elections at the moment since all relevant institutions for conducting fair 
elections are under its control or influence.232  
In spite of these gaps (in the factors that force decision makers towards 
political will that facilitates good governance, rule of law and strong democratic 
institutions), the unpredictability of what may transpire in the future with respect 
to the overwhelming power of the ruling party, long term consideration of peace 
and development that would accrue from good governance may allure the party 
to take these reforms. Considering these factors, the ruling party should 
demonstrate a firm political will to address issues of good governance, rule of 
law and strong democratic institutions in general which have contributed to the 
fragile protection of the right to freedom of assembly in Ethiopia.  
Conclusion 
The comparative study in this article has identified a number of problems in the 
Ethiopian legal regime that regulates freedom of assembly. At the constitutional 
level, the absence of an explicit and full-fledged proportionality requirement in 
the FDRE Constitution for assessing the acceptability of limitations on freedom 
of assembly is noted as a problem. Even though the Constitution requires the 
interpretation of human rights (incorporated in it) to be in line with international 
treaties, the reference is too generic and proportionality is not immediately 
evident. This will make the task of enforcement and application unrealistic 
given the bad track record of the country in democracy, rule of law and human 
rights protection. Hence, there is good reason to be sceptical about this 
approach. Instead, an explicit incorporation of proportionality and its 
constitutive elements in the Constitution (as in the Kenyan Constitution) is a 
better approach for protecting freedom of assembly rather than merely relying 
on international treaties as guide for interpretation and conformity.  
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Second, at the sub-constitutional level, the existing Ethiopian legislation 
governing assemblies contains many lacunae. Particularly, its provisions 
regulating the notification procedure for conducting an assembly and the 
decision making process are deeply flawed giving too much discretionary power 
for authorities to do whatever they want. The non-existence of a provision that 
guarantees the accountability of the authorities through judicial and 
administrative review has further rendered the right to freedom of assembly 
defenceless and the authorities unaccountable. Thus, an Ethiopian assembly law 
that meets the test of proportionality must be enacted without delay to fill 
significant gaps in the existing law and to make it compatible with international 
standards set by the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of assembly and 
association, UN Human Rights Committee and the Venice Commission of 
Experts. But for these reforms to happen in the existing legal landscape 
governing freedom of assembly and be implemented subsequently in 
appropriate manner, it requires the political will of the ruling party of Ethiopia 
(EPRDF) which holds the key decision making power toward facilitating the 
enhancement of good governance and rule of law, and enabling democratic 
institutions to discharge their constitutional responsibilities.  
All these interrelated matters require political will and they have a direct 
repercussion for in/adequate protection of the right to freedom of assembly. For 
instance, adopting a good law on freedom of assembly requires a strong 
democratic institution i.e. parliament which critically debates on proposed bills 
and ensures its proportionality with regard to the affected right. This in turn 
depends on free and fair elections and a genuine multi-party democracy that puts 
fundamental rights at its core which is an imperative element of good 
governance. Likewise, commitment to rule of law is essential to constrain the 
parliament from enacting a law that infringes freedom of assembly and to 
control the executive from applying the law in an improper manner. It also 
instils transparency, a culture of justification and accountability in their 
functions.  
Moreover, when the parliament and the executive commit infringements in 
respecting and protecting the right to freedom of assembly, strong democratic 
institutions such as courts, national human rights bodies, the media and civil 
societies are expected to intervene and defend the right, and this requires 
autonomy and operating space. Hence, in the interest of sustainable peace and 
development, the ruling party should demonstrate genuine commitment to issues 
of democracy, good governance, rule of law and respect for fundamental rights 
including freedom of assembly. In the absence of such commitment and political 
will, it would be naïve to expect the full-fledged protection of the right to 
freedom of assembly in the Ethiopian law and practice.                                      ■ 
